Financial centres' competitiveness and economic convergence: evidence from the European Union regions by Degl'Innocenti, Marta et al.
1 
 
Financial Centres’ Competitiveness and Economic Convergence: Evidence from the EU Regions  
 
Marta Degl’Innocenti1, Roman Matousek2, Nickolaos G. Tzeremes3  
 
 
1Corresponding Author. University of Southampton, Southampton Business School, Highfield, Southampton, SO17 
1BJ, United Kingdom. Tel. +44 23 8059 8093, Fax +44 23 8059 3844, E-mail address: 
m.deglinnocenti@soton.ac.uk. 
 
2 Kent Business School, the University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NZ, United Kingdom, Tel. +44 (0)1227 82 
7465, Fax 44 (0)1227 8271111, E-mail address: R.Matousek@kent.ac.uk.  
 
3University of Thessaly, Department of Economics, 28th October street, 78, 38333, Volos, Greece, Tel. +30 2421 
074911, Fax +30 2421074772, E-mail address: bus9nt@econ.uth.gr.  
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We would like to thank Professor Jessie Poon and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful and 
constructive comments on an earlier version of our manuscript. Any remaining errors are solely the authors’ 
responsibility. 
 
Abstract 
 
This study analyses the gaps in financial centres’ competitiveness and their impact on regional economic 
convergence in 23 EU Member States during the period of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In particular, we 
explore the economic convergence and divergence patterns among regions from two different perspectives across 
the selected EU Member States and within each country. From a methodological viewpoint, we apply a fully non-
parametric framework to the club convergence model and address the endogeneity problem between financial 
centres’ competitiveness and regional economic convergence. Our results show that the large and internationally-
oriented financial centres experienced a diverging trend in terms of the competitiveness of financial centres’ business 
environment during the peak of the crisis. We also find evidence that the convergence of financial centres reduces 
regional economic inequalities between the regions where financial centres are located. In contrast, the increase in 
the competitiveness of financial centres only serves to widen existing inequalities at the national level. Finally, we 
examine and discuss the impact of competitiveness drivers of financial centres on the convergence pattern of EU 
regions. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
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The process of economic convergence across European Union (EU) Member States and regions has attracted 
considerable attention from researchers and policymakers in the last two decades. A number of recent studies have 
contributed to academic discussions on economic convergence and growth patterns in the EU (see Ezcurra et al., 
2009; Le Gallo and Dall’Erba, 2008; López-Bazo et al., 1999; Petrakos et al., 2005; Tselios et al., 2012). The 
common thread that runs through all these studies is that EU regions display significant and persistent disparities. 
Such findings raise questions as to whether the convergence process is achievable in the near future within EU 
regions and consequently within Member States.  
Drawing on the regional convergence theory (López-Bazo et al., 1999), this study explores the convergence 
process within EU regions during the period of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) by extending the previous 
empirical research on financial development and economic growth (e.g. Aghion et al., 2005; Henderson et al., 2013; 
Petrakos et al., 2005, 2011).  The contribution of this paper can be summarised as follows. First, we advance the 
current research on financial development and regional studies by analysing the effect of financial centres’ 
competitiveness on interregional economic dynamics. Current empirical research has not extensively investigated 
the influence of global financial centres on the convergence trend of EU regions. Up until now, contemporary studies 
have analysed only individual financial centres (Amsterdam, London and Frankfurt) in the period before the GFC 
(Poon, 2003; Engelen, 2007; Engelen and Grote, 2009; Klagge and Martin, 2005; Karreman and Van der Knaap, 
2009).i Instead, the period that we examine spans from 2008 to 2012. In this way, we contribute to the understanding 
of regional growth dynamics and policies during the ‘shock period’ of the GFC. 
Second, we investigate how financial centres’ competitiveness explains the trend of economic convergence 
(divergence) at national and regional levels. In particular, one part of our analysis focuses on the effect of financial 
centres on the economic convergence of the regions in which the financial centres are located. Another part 
investigates the effect of financial centres’ development on regional inequality levels within countries. We also 
discuss and examine the factors that drive the convergence of economic performance of regions where financial 
centres are located. 
Third, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study that applies a local linear estimator (Li and Racine 
2004, 2007) to the club convergence model of Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996). The proposed methodological 
framework allows us to estimate the convergence of financial centres’ competitiveness on regional economic 
convergence in a fully non-parametric setting. This approach is more flexible and overcomes several limitations of 
the traditional parametric techniques commonly used in the convergence literature. We also address the potential 
endogeneity problem between the competitiveness of financial centres and the regional economic 
convergence/divergence. We introduce in the context of this analysis a new non-parametric instrumental regression 
(Horowitz, 2011). The applied estimator deals directly in a fully non-parametric framework with the potential 
endogeneity problems.  Finally, as a robustness check of our empirical finding we apply probability transition 
matrices (Hammond and Thompson, 2002; Pittau and Zelli, 2006; Quah, 1996). 
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 The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the convergence of the European financial 
centres; Section 3 describes the database and methodology; Section 4 discusses the empirical findings; Section 5 
sets out our conclusions and outlines directions for further research. 
 
2. Financial Centres and Economic Regional Convergence 
The economic convergence and integration of European regions have been recently addressed in several studies, for 
example, Ezcurra and Rapun, 2005; Ezcurra et al., 2009; Le Gallo and Dall’Erba, 2008; Petrakos et al., 2005; 2009; 
Tselios et al., 2012, among others. In particular, the high variability of economic resources and the uneven 
geographical growth within European countries has drawn a lot of attention. The main research questions are aimed 
at understanding regional growth patterns and to what extent regional economic dissimilarities are intrinsically 
structural, or rather cyclical.  This is an important issue because the catch-up process has not always been deemed 
effective or fast enough, even though the European Commission has promoted European economic integration 
through several key policy initiatives (the Single Market, Monetary Union, and, more recently, through the European 
Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, and the European Social Fund). 
In addition, opposite dynamics appear to prevail for national and regional economies in Europe, namely a 
converging trend at the national level and a diverging trend at the regional level. As some authors have emphasised 
(Longhi and Musolesi, 2007; Petrakos et al., 2011), the main driver of this paradox can be traced to the development 
of metropolitan areas. The New Economic Geography (NEG) developed by Krugman (1981, 1991) can explain part 
of the above mentioned paradox. In particular, the NEG accounts for the existence of a diverging trend in the process 
of economic integration in Europe. The reason is that the combination of agglomeration forces and market size 
creates the conditions in which leader regions can develop and grow, and it predicts the process of geographical 
agglomeration of production, high quality resources, and services in specific locations. The rationale is that 
agglomeration economies on the local allocation of resources favour the polarisation of regions into different ‘clubs’: 
poor peripheral regions and rich central-core regions. In this process, metropolitan areas have played a pivotal role, 
as they are strategic nodes of the modern economy because they offer high-level innovation services and a large 
labour market with a wide range of specialised qualifications (Longhi and Musolesi, 2007). These are all conditions 
that are crucial for both the stability and viability of firms.  Large metropolitan areas therefore attract an increasing 
number of firms and tend to absorb resources from the surrounding areas.   
In this context of increasing metropolisation, our first research question is based on whether the 
competitiveness of financial centres can contribute to explain the opposite trends between national and regional 
economies. Our investigation is motivated by the fact that financial centres are well-integrated in metropolitan areas 
that are major international hubs of business (Daniels, 2002). The headquarters of the majority of financial firms 
and services are also concentrated in international financial centres (Amin and Thrift, 1992). This is because it is 
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almost imperative for financial institutions to be close to the clients. A tight spatial proximity to financial institutions 
located in international financial centres appears, in fact, to still facilitate the process of knowledge creation and 
dispersion (Engelen 2007; Faulconbridge et al., 2007). This is crucial for conducting profitable trades despite the 
advancement in information and communication technology (ICT) and the consequent reduction of the costs of 
communication and trading across space. Our hypothesis is, therefore, that the convergence of competitiveness of 
financial centres could help to explain the two opposite dynamics (regional economic convergence and divergence) 
at the European level. However, the way through which financial centres affect the regional economic convergence 
trends is not straightforward, especially during periods of financial turmoil.  
On the one hand, a structural convergence of European financial centres can increase the international business 
cycle correlations of European regions and therefore could lead to convergence in per capita income. This view is 
consistent with Wacziarg (2001), who suggests that structural sector convergence within regions can lead to 
convergence in their per capita income. In this case, we argue that the increasing appeal of a financial centre can 
contribute to explaining the catch-up process of regional economies. However, we maintain that peripheral regions 
in a certain country can further lose their competitiveness because of a sort of draining process of capital and 
technological resources towards the regions where financial centres are located. Financial centres have been widely 
recognised to work as catalysts for labour forces, business, specialised corporate services and major financial 
institutions, and to promote technical innovation (Cassis, 2007). While regions where financial centres are located 
have a greater capacity to attract businesses and human resources, peripheral regions do not exert the same appeal. 
The distance from advanced regions can in fact discourage location decisions by firms operating mainly in national 
and international markets (Limao and Venables, 2001). As a result, this outlook could explain the uneven spatial 
distribution of economic and financial firms and services and explain the existence of different regional clubs. 
On the other hand, the correlation and the increasing international profile of financial centres can make them 
more exposed to external shocks. Previous research acknowledges that there are some limits regarding the financial 
development and economic growth nexus during financially unstable periods. For example, Dell’Arricia et al. (2008) 
show that financial development does not always lead to economic growth in periods of financial turbulence. 
Kroszner et al. (2007) argue that those sectors that are highly dependent on external finance are more vulnerable to 
bank crises and experience a greater contraction in the valued added, especially in more developed financial systems. 
The financial centres have played a pivotal role in originating and spreading the GFC to domestic financial systems, 
‘real’ economies, and everyday households (French et al., 2009). Therefore, we assume that the convergence of 
financial centres could have further weakened the regional economic convergence at the European level during times 
of crisis. In this case, the regions of leading financial centres would not be in a position to widen their existing spatial 
disparities with respect to less advanced regions. In addition, one may question whether we can observe a divergent 
trend between regions at the national level. In fact, the potentially negative impact of the GFC on international 
financial centres could have slowed the transfer of resources from other regions to the regions where financial centres 
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are located. However, such an impact depends on the connectivity and specialisation of financial centres. European 
global financial centres (such as London, Frankfurt, Luxemburg and Paris) rely more on global and international 
relations with, for example, each other rather than on their national city systems (Z/Yen Group, 2010). Instead, 
second and third-tier financial centres are more orientated on the transnational and local businesses, and act primarily 
as producer service centres, rather than dealing with large-scale and global financial transactions (Lee et al., 1993). 
This makes second and third-tier financial centres less exposed to financial crises, which in turn would suggest that 
these latter financial centres can diverge from their growth pattern at a slower rate compared to financial centres that 
are more connected to each other. 
A second question that emerges here is what factors contribute to the attractiveness of financial centres and, 
in turn, what explains the regional convergence at the European level and regional divergence at the national level. 
This issue is important because there are still relevant dissimilarities among financial centres, such as local financial 
regulations, corporate governance practices, and the business environment (Klagge and Martin, 2005; Karreman and 
Van der Knaap, 2009). In particular, previous studies have extensively investigated the organisational structure of 
the European financial system and the factors that contribute to the success of the stock exchange and financial 
market, and richness of local economies. While economic theory has traditionally attributed regional difference 
between financial centres to initial endowments (such as reputation, openness to foreign banks and accessibility 
(Jones, 1992), comparative advantages do not provide enough explanation for the spatial concentration of activity 
in specific financial centres with similar production structures. Financial centres benefit from a combination of 
agglomeration forces and market size to attract more businesses and financial services firms, high quality human 
resources, and services (Grote, 2008). Agglomeration mechanisms allow financial centres to improve their 
competitiveness through economies of scale, increasing inter-sectoral linkages, technological spillovers, and 
reduced transaction and transportation costs. Furthermore, Thrift (1994) and Porteous (1999), and more recently 
Faulconbridge et al. (2007), have emphasised that regulations and administrative procedures clearly matter for the 
spatial distribution of financial activities. The Bund-future market offers a clear example of the importance of 
regulation. In particular, due to the prevention of derivatives trading in Germany until 1990, the Bund-future market 
was initially traded and regulated in London even though it was primarily based on German federal bonds 
(Laulajainen, 2001). Subsequently, as a result of the re-regulation process, the Bund-future market moved to 
Frankfurt because of the advantages of the German electronic trading system, especially its cost-efficiency 
(Faulconbridge et al., 2007). Other examples in this regard are Luxembourg and Dublin, who appeal to hedge funds 
and other money managers because of their competitive fiscal systems.  
The attractiveness and comparative advantage of a given financial centre is also determined by sectoral 
specialisation. Historically, London and New York are the main global financial centres that attract a high number 
of firms because of their agglomerations of financial institutions and specialised and timeliness services (Wójcik, 
2013). However, national or local financial centres still preserve their comparative advantages. These latter centres 
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tend to compensate lower economies of scale and reduce asymmetric information provided by nationally-oriented 
firms with a higher focus on specific financial products or services (Karreman and Van der Knaap, 2009). This can 
favour an in-depth knowledge of supplier and costumers, which is important to conduct complex and sophisticated 
trades. Aside from market characteristics, the attractiveness of financial centres is also determined by the local 
institutional, social, and environmental settings (Engelen et al., 2010; Gertler, 2010; Karreman and Van der Knaap, 
2009). In fact, these factors exert a pervasive influence on the economy as a whole as they influence the business 
objectives and conduct of firms, managers, investors, and workers through an ensemble of formal regulations, and 
legislation as well as informal societal norms (Gertler, 2004). The existence of an advanced environmental and 
institutional setting, together with the attraction of high-skill labour and innovation, are all factors that can 
specifically increase the success of financial centres and favour the agglomeration of financial services. As a result, 
the combination of all these factors will give rise to higher regional economic growth rates over time and further 
enlarge the gap between more and less advanced regions where financial centres are located. Arguably, as the 
relevant literature suggests (for example, Crescenzi and Giua, 2016; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; Petrakos 
et al., 2005, 2011), structural socio-economic conditions in terms of productive structure, labour market, innovative 
capacity, and infrastructural endowment act as important determinants of regional economic growth. In particular, 
more advanced regions – where financial centres are typically located – can better benefit from higher economies 
of scale, agglomeration economies, higher level of innovation, more skilled human resources, and a more advanced 
market structure, compared to less advanced regions (Petrakos et al., 2011). While the attractiveness of financial 
centres is affected by regulatory, institutional and technological environments, financial centres are not merely 
passive recipients of the geography of uneven development (Lee et al., 1993). They in fact contribute themselves to 
the development and growth of the economic context wherein they operate. This reciprocal effect generates a 
potential endogeneity issue that is typical of the economic growth-financial development relationship (for example, 
Aghion et al., 2005; Henderson et al., 2013). This issue needs to be fully addressed from a methodological viewpoint. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data sample  
The data on the competitiveness of European financial centres is provided by the Global Financial Centres Index 
(GFCI), which is produced by the Z/Yen Group in association with the City of London Corporation. The GFCI 
provides profiles, ratings and rankings for 75 financial centres, drawing on two distinct sources of data: external 
indices available at the country level (for example, the Global Competitiveness Index, Business Environment, the 
Centres of Commerce Index, the occupancy costs index, and the corruption perception index) and responses to an 
online survey. The index encompasses five key indicators as reported below: people, business environment, market 
access, infrastructure and general competitiveness. People refers to the availability of good personnel, business 
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education, and the flexibility of the labour market; business environment measures the regulation system (e.g. tax 
rates, levels of corruption, economic freedom and the ease of doing business); market access includes the level of 
securitisation, volume and value of trading in equities and bonds, and the number of firms engaged in the financial 
service sector; infrastructure takes into consideration the cost and availability of buildings and office space; and 
finally, general competitiveness refers to the overall competitiveness of the city and quality of life.   
The uniqueness of the database is that the GFCI indexii incorporates all the essential aspects identified by the 
economic geography literature to be important for productivity growth, agglomeration economies and increasing 
returns, such as a skilled and flexible labour market, access to capital, infrastructure efficiency and quality, 
transportation costs, and regulatory and institutional settings. We collect data for these five key indicators from the 
Global Competitiveness Index (GFI) Database provided by the World Economic Forum.iii Based on the reports 
produced by the Z/Yen Group, the GFI displays a high correlation with the GFCI. Furthermore, it encompasses the 
most relevant and recurrent (listed as an important source for the GFCI for at least three years) sources of 
competitiveness at the country level for financial centres. We consider as drivers of the economic 
convergence/divergence of European regions the following indices of the GFI database: infrastructure 
(infrastructure); higher education and training, and labour market efficiency (people); market size and goods market 
efficiency (market access); business sophistication, innovation, institutions, macroeconomic environment and 
technological readiness (business environment), health and primary education (overall competitiveness). 
We then assess the level of welfare in terms of regional GDP per capita at the NUTS3 level. We collected the 
data on GDP per capita from Eurostat. Our sample covers the period 2008–2012. We exclude the City of London 
from our sample. Clark (2002) and Faulconbridge (2004) show that London has a different type of financial system 
compared to continental Europe. It has a high volume of institutional and pension fund assets, privileged interchange 
with the US, diversification, and different services and product ranges. London acts as an outlier in our sample 
because it shows a very high rating and GDP compared to respectively the other European financial centres and 
regions.  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the GFCI gaps, drivers of competitiveness and instruments used to 
address the endogeneity issue. Table 1 clearly indicates a wide heterogeneity GDP per capita within the European 
regions. It also shows that the GFCI is highly volatile, which means that it differs considerably across individual 
financial centres.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 2 shows the average level of the GFCI for the 23 European financial centres for the period 2008–2012. 
In particular, we observe that Frankfurt is the benchmark city in terms of the GFCI for our analysis as it was the 
leading centre in continental Europe during the period from 2008 to 2012. In particular, Frankfurt is competitive in 
the areas of human capital and business environment. It has also gained a strategic importance by being Germany’s 
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leading financial centre, which also provides specialist business services for transnational firms (Taylor et al., 2014). 
It is well-known globally, and presents a rich environment of different types of financial service institutions (Z/Yen 
Group, 2010). Table 2 reports the average GDP per capita from 2008 to 2012 for the NUTS3 level regions where 
financial centres are located. Paris is the leading centre in terms of GDP per capita. Table 2 also shows the average 
growth of GDP for the regions where the financial centres are located and those of all the other regions (in average 
terms) within a country. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
3.2 Methodological approach 
The methodological approach refers to the notion of a club that can be traced back to Baumol (1986). This framework 
examines the long-run growth determined by different tendencies in regional patterns of growth and convergence. 
 Differing from previous studies, we extend the club convergence model proposed by Chatterji and Dewhurst 
(1996) by applying for the first time a local linear non-parametric technique (Li and Racine 2004, 2007). The 
majority of previous studies on club convergence use parametric estimation in order to examine the non-linear 
specification of convergence clubs with a few exceptions (Ezcurra et al., 2009). Our approach is more flexible as it 
does not require several necessary assumptions, such as the relationship form between the estimated initial and final 
gap, the existence of equilibria points, as well as monotonicity, concavity and homogeneity. Furthermore, the data 
directly determines the shape of the relationship between initial gaps and final gaps, and consequently the speed and 
size of convergence/divergence. We describe the main steps to replicate our analysis as follows. 
We start by formalising the technology gap between a leading region and other regions, following Chatterji 
(1992) and Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996). Specifically, I and F are the initial and final period under investigation. 
The GDP per capita in a final year  ,i FGDPPC can then be represented as: 
 , ,
if
i F i IGDPPC e GDPPC ,         (1) 
where  ,i IGDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in the initial period. Then taking the logarithms and 
solving for  if , the growth rate over a specific period can be estimated as , ,i i F i If GDPPC GDPPC  . The GDP per 
capita gaps between leading region (L) and another region i (i=1,..,N) can then be expressed as: 
, , ,L F L I L IGDPPC GDPPC bGDPPC   ,                 (2) 
, , ,i F i I i IGDPPC GDPPC bGDPPC   .                 (3) 
where α is the steady state growth rate and b is the convergence coefficient. 
By subtracting and re-arranging (3) from (2), we obtain:  
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    , , , ,1L F i F L I i IGDPPC GDPPC b GDPPC GDPPC    ,               (4) 
Equation (4) can be re-written as: 
, ,i F i IGGDPPC GGDPPC ,         (5) 
where  1 b   and 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖  represents the gap between the leading regions and the other regions’ GDP per 
capita levels. Following the same procedure, we also construct two other gaps: (i) between financial centres’ rating 
levels (GRAT); and (ii) between the GDP per capita levels of the regions where a financial centre is located and 
those of other regions within the same country (WGGDPPC). For the calculation of WGGDPPC, we consider all 
regions at the NUTS3 level in each country. 
We then apply the local linear non-parametric regression (Li and Racine 2004, 2007) that takes the following 
form:iv 
  , , ,  1,..., ,i F i I iGGDPPC m GGDPPC u i n                                   (6) 
 , , ,  1,..., .i F i I iGRAT m GRAT u i n           (7) 
Equation (6) refers to the club convergence-divergence of GDP per capita gaps (GGDPPC) using the local linear 
estimator, whereas equation (7) analyses the club convergence-divergence of financial centres’ rating gaps (GRAT). 
In equations (6) and (7)  𝑚(∙) represents the unknown smooth function that can be interpreted as the conditional 
mean of the dependent variable given the independent variable, whereas iu denotes the disturbances. We also use the 
local linear estimator to investigate the effect of financial centres’ rating gaps (GRAT) on: (i) the regions’ GDP per 
capita gaps (GGDPPC) in which the financial centres are located; and (ii) the GDP per capita gaps of the regions 
where a financial centre is located and the other regions within the same country (WGGDPPC). These equations 
take the following form: 
  ,  1,..., ,i i iGGDPPC m GRAT u i n           (8) 
  ,  1,..., .i i iWGGDPPC m GRAT u i n           (9) 
However, it must be mentioned that the analysis of the regional gaps does not allows us to identify whether 
the divergence/convergence is driven by the leader or lagging regions. Furthermore, the divergence/convergence 
process between the GDP can also be driven by further characteristics of both the regions where financial centres 
are located and the other regions.  The relative literature explains analytically the mechanisms of 
converging/diverging patterns between EU regions (e.g. Crescenzi, 2005; Crescenzi and Giua, 2016; Le Gallo and 
Dall’Erba, 2008; Petrakos et al., 2005, 2011). However, and given the potential limitations of the adopted 
methodology, one of the advantages of the non-parametric model is that it is robust to potential omitted variables. 
(Frölich, 2007, Li and Racine, 2007).  Therefore, we are still able to get robust results of the included variables 
without including specific regional variables for lagging regions.  
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Regardless, of this potential advantage and as a further robustness check, we apply a probability transition 
matrix (inter alia Hammond and Thompson, 2002; Pittau and Zelli, 2006; Quah, 1996) in order to examine the 
probability of divergence/convergence of GRAT, GGDPPC, and WGGDPPC. As a first step of the analysis we 
separate the estimated gaps (i.e. GRAT, GGDPPC and WGGDPPC) into four states representing four discrete states 
(i.e. from State 1: lower gaps to State 4: largest gaps) over the period 2008–2012 (see Appendix C for details). 
As discussed in the literature review, there can be an endogeneity issue between financial centres’ 
competitiveness and regional economic convergence. Such an issue should be tackled by the non-parametric 
regression analysis. As pointed out by Frölich (2007) non-parametric approaches permit a better treatment of the 
effect of heterogeneity (over the parametric specifications) since the local linear estimator gives the value of the 
regression function at a given point by using neighbouring observations. As a result, it minimises possible 
endogeneity problems that can affect the relationship between the financial centres’ gaps and regional economic 
gaps. We also address the endogeneity problem by running a non-parametric instrumental variable regression. This 
is important because the vast majority of the previous empirical investigations do not include endogenous regressors 
in their non-parametric regression analysis. In particular, by following Horowitz (2011), we employ a 
methodological framework that directly incorporates the instrumental variables into the estimation. This framework 
is based on a local polynomial kernel regression. Specifically, the applied estimator allows – under the presence of 
instrumental variables – 𝑚 in equations (8) and (9) to be defined as a Fredholm equation of the first kind, which is 
the solution to an ill-posed inverse problem.v This enables us to directly address the endogeneity issues without 
imposing any functional form on, and linearity between, the variables. For the choice of the instrument variables to 
be included in our model, we follow the procedure introduced recently by Henderson et al. (2013). They propose a 
rigorous and innovative approach to select appropriate instrumental variables in a non-parametric regression 
framework.  As a result, we first regress the potential instruments on the regional economic gaps by employing a 
local linear least square regression (Li and Racine, 2007). We then select only the variables that are not related to 
the dependent variable (regional economic gap, see equations 8 and 9). A further step of our analysis is to examine 
the correlation of the selected instruments with the endogenous regressors and we use them as instrumental variables 
in the non-parametric IV regression. After applying the described procedure, consistent with Henderson et al. (2013), 
we use the following instruments: Deposit Money Bank Assets/ (Deposit Money + Central) Bank Assets 
(DBACBA); Deposit Money Bank Assets/GDP (DBAGDP); Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks/GDP 
(PCRDGDP); and Bank Deposits/GDP (BDGDP).  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Convergence clubs for financial centres and regional GDP per capita 
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In this subsection we discuss the results that we obtain for the club convergence of our sample of EU23 financial 
centres. In particular, we assess how various global financial centres (such as Frankfurt, Luxemburg and Paris), and 
second and third-tier financial centres were differently affected by the GFC. This analysis also allows us to better 
understand whether the reduction of economic regional inequalities where financial centres are located is explained 
by a loss of competitiveness by top-tier financial centres, rather than to the catch-up process of second and third-tier 
financial centres. 
Insert Figure 1.a-b about here 
Figure 1 shows the convergence of the GFCI index (Subfigure 1.a) and GDP per capita between the regions 
where the financial centres are located (Subfigure 1.b) in 2008 compared to 2012.  In Subfigure 1.a, we see that 
there are two clubs of financial centres in Europe, which indicates the existence of multi-equilibria points. 
Specifically, the first club encompasses the financial centres that have the highest GFCI, such as Frankfurt, 
Luxemburg, Paris, Dublin, Edinburgh and Munich, and those with a mid-high level GFCI. The group of leading 
financial centres in terms of competitiveness, that includes Dublin, Edinburgh, Luxembourg, Paris, shows a 
diverging pattern from Frankfurt over the period 2008-2012. In a borderline position between the first and second 
club, there are the financial centres in western Europe with a mid-high GFCI, such as Amsterdam, Stockholm, 
Copenhagen, Munich, Glasgow, Helsinki and Vienna. Among themthe Nordic financial centres, Helsinki, 
Copenhagen and Stockholm, converge toward the top club.  
The second club includes the financial centres in western Europe (such as Milan, Rome, Madrid and Brussels) 
that have a transnational profile. These centres maintain a leading position with respect to the other Eastern and 
Western financial centres such as Lisbon and Athens. Several eastern European financial centres, such as Warsaw, 
Prague, Budapest and Tallinn exhibit a slow increase in competitiveness during the period 2008-2012. The existence 
of multiple clubs among the financial centres aligns with the findings of Poon (2003) who shows that the global 
system of world financial and capital centers (WFCC) was characterized by different tiers over the period 1980-
1998. Moreover, our findings suggest that regardless the increased trend of competitiveness among the cross-country 
regions in which the financial centres are located, there are still consistent intra-country regional discrepancies. This 
is due to the fact that industrial production and financial activities have been mainly concentrated in the capital cities 
in which the financial centres are located. This finding aligns with the view by Klagge and Martin (2005), who argue 
that financial markets operate in a non-neutral way across space-economy. This suggests that the concentration of 
capital markets in a specific region has a detrimental effect on the allocation of funds and resources in respect to the 
other (non-central) regions.    
 Sub-Figure 1.b shows the convergence and divergence patterns between the GDP per capita gap of European 
regions where financial centres are located and the leading city, Paris. What emerges from Sub-Figure 1.b is that the 
speed of convergence and divergence of regional economies is slower and characterised by more steady states as 
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suggested by previous studies (for example, Le Gallo and Dall’Erba, 2008). This finding confirms that there is a 
persistent inequality within European regions with two convergence clubs within the wealthier EU regions. Among 
the second club of rich regions, Brussels and Dublin show a diverging trend from the leading centres. In contrast, 
Stockholm, Amsterdam, but also Munich appear to catch up with the richer regions in terms of both competitiveness, 
as seen earlier, and welfare. Furthermore, it is evident that the financial crisis has slowed the economic growth of 
the majority of financial centres. In contrast, we find that the regions of Frankfurt, Paris and Luxemburg, where the 
top European centres are located, grew at a constant rate over the entire period. These results are consistent with 
several empirical studies (Corrado et al., 2005), which state that economic convergence is more likely to happen for 
highly developed economies.  
 A third club consists of the western European regions that exhibit a decreasing trend compared to the leading 
regions. A diverging trend is also evident for low-productivity eastern regions, such as Tallinn, Budapest, Warsaw 
and Prague. This in turn suggests the existence of a persistent trend rather than a cyclical trend for some eastern 
European economies. The dynamics of financial centres’ inequalities during the examined short-term period appear 
to slow down regions’ economic growth prospects.  
Insert Table 3 about here   
Table 3 presents the average of annual transition matrices over the GFC for the three gap-categories and the 
four states.vi Specifically, Panel A presents the different states of the financial centres’ rating gaps. The diagonal 
elements indicate the probability of countries remaining in the same state over the examined period, whereas the 
off-diagonal elements indicate the probability of movement across states. It is evident that financial centres with 
lower financial rating gaps (State 1) and higher rating gaps (State 4) are more likely to stay in the same state rather 
than move to a higher state (State 2) or lower state (State 3), respectively. Instead, financial centres in State 2 or 3 
have a higher probability of either converging to (move towards a lower state) or diverging from leading financial 
centres (move towards a higher state)vii. In a similar manner, Panel B of Table 3 examines the movements of GDP 
gaps among the different EU regions in which the financial centres are located, while Panel C analyses the 
movements of GDP gaps between the region where a financial centre is located and the other regions in the same 
country Finally, Panel C suggests that there is not a high probability that within country regions’ GDP gaps will not 
change from their initial state during the examined period. The results from the above analysis complement and 
verify our previous findings, suggesting different convergence/divergence clubs among the regions and the financial 
centres.  
4.2 Financial centres’ competitiveness and the European economic converging trend and national diverging trend 
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This section addresses our first research question, namely whether the convergence of competitiveness of financial 
centres could help to explain the two opposite dynamics (economic regional convergence and divergence) at the 
European level. 
In particular, Figure 2 examines the effect of the convergence of the financial centres’ ratings gaps (GRAT) 
on the regional inequality measured in terms of GDP per capita (GGDPPC) of the regions in which the financial 
centres are located.viii   
Insert Figure 2.a-b about here 
Subfigure 2.a shows the results for the non-parametric regression (Li and Racine, 2007) (red dash-dotted line). To 
take into account the possible endogeneity issue between the GFCI rating‘s gaps (GRAT) and the gaps in terms of 
GDP per capita between the regions where financial centres are located (GGDPPC) we also run a non-parametric 
instrumental variable regression (Horowitz, 2011) (blue dashed-line). Our findings suggest that an increase of the 
gaps of financial centres’ rating levels (GRAT) has a positive effect on the in-terms GDP per capita gap between the 
regions where financial centres are located (GGDPPC), as indicated by the increasing non-parametric line. A similar 
trend is also confirmed by the non-parametric instrumental variable regression. These two findings provide strong 
support for the fact that the competitiveness of financial centres contributes to explain the economic converging 
trends of the regions where financial centres are located. However, this relationship appears to follow a non-linear 
pattern especially when we focus on the non-parametric instrumental variable regression (dashed line).  
Subfigure 2.b. focuses on the relationship between the GFCI rating’s gaps (GRAT) and the gaps in terms of 
GDP per capita between the regions where financial centres are located and the other regions within the same country 
(WGGDPPC).  In a similar manner, our findings suggest that WGGDPPC decreases as the GRAT increases, which 
indicates that an increase in financial centres’ competitiveness contributes to the enlargement of existing inequalities 
between regions within countries (WGGDPPC). Furthermore, we note that in this case the line of the non-parametric 
instrumental variable regression has a remarkable curvilinear pattern. Overall, this result shows that financial centres 
also contribute to determine the diverging trend between regions at the national level. This would suggest that the 
regions where financial centres are located attract resources from more peripheral regions in this way enlarging their 
existing gap with them. Poor regions therefore become poorer, while rich regions can reinforce their prevailing 
position. This finding again verifies the non-neutrality hypothesis described previously. It means that the allocation 
of resources is concentrated only on the regions in which the financial markets are located (Klagge and Martin, 
2005). 
Table 4 addresses our second research hypothesis, which is related to the factors that contribute to the 
attractiveness of financial centres and in turn affects the regions where the financial centres are located. Therefore, 
we are able to identify and analyse the convergence process at the European level and divergence process at the 
national level. In particular, Table 4 reports the F-statistics and estimated p-values of the non-parametric regressions 
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where we examine the impact of competitiveness drivers on WGGDPPC and GGDPPC. In addition, Figure 3 
displays how WGGDPPC and GGDPPC change for the effect of the increase of each competitiveness source of the 
GFCI.  
Insert Table 4 about here   
Insert Figure 3.a-b about here   
From Table 4, we observe that the competitiveness drivers of the GFCI exhibit a contrary impact on WGGDPPC 
and GGDPPC. This is plausible since the GFCI exerts a diverging impact on WGGDPPC and GGDPPC. As depicted 
in Subfigure 3.a.1-2, our results provide evidence that infrastructure (INFRA), goods market efficiency 
(MAREFFG), market size (MARKSIZ) and business sophistication (BUSSOPH) contribute to the economic catch-
up process of regions where financial centres are located. These findings provide further support for existing studies 
(for example, Petrakos et al. 2011) that find similar sources to be important factors for economic growth, especially 
in the case of wealthier regions. These regions are more likely to benefit from agglomeration economies, positive 
externalities and a high-skilled labour force. As a result, they grow faster and tend to accelerate their interregional 
divergence pattern with respect to less wealthy regions. When looking at the role of key drivers of WGGDPPC 
(Subfigure 3.b.1-2), we find that infrastructure (INFRA); health and primary education (HEALTH); higher education 
and training (EDU); goods market efficiency (MARKEFFG); market size (MARKSIZ); institutional quality (INST); 
technological readiness (TECHREAD); business sophistication (BUSSOPH); and innovation (INN) have a highly 
significant impact (Table 3). Consistent with previous studies (Crescenzi and Giua, 2016; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2011; Petrakos et al., 2005, 2011), our findings confirm the importance of structural socio-economic 
conditions, such as market forces, policy factors and infrastructural endowment for regional economic convergence. 
In particular, we find that the quality of transport, electricity and telephony infrastructure (INFRA), ix high levels of 
efficiency of the institutions (INST) (in terms of adequate property rights, low undue influence, government 
efficiency and security), ITC use, technological adoption (TECH READ), and business sophistication (BUSSOPH) 
reduce regional disparities within a country. In contrast, market size and efficiency, health and primary education, 
and capacity of innovation appear to enlarge the interregional gaps within a country (WGGDPPC). In line with 
Crescenzi (2005)’s argument, freely available technological knowledge (such as TECHREAD) can favour 
convergence among regions, while innovative activities acquired through education, R&D investment and other 
innovation activities (such as INN) can lead to regional disparities, due to the accumulation of knowledge in 
wealthier regions. This can therefore explain the contrasting trend between TECH READ and INN.  
Furthermore, as suggested by Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004), an increase in market access and the opening 
of borders could help wealthier regions to compete in integrated markets as they are able to attract more innovative 
firms and high-skilled labour. In contrast, poorer regions within a country cannot usually rely on the same 
entrepreneurial activities as wealthier regions. They depend more on public employment, State and European support 
15 
 
and are therefore less capable of competing in more integrated markets. An open market, MARKEFFG and 
MARKSIZ, can thus contribute to the catch-up process of regions where financial centres are located on an 
international basis, but at the same time can harm the economic converge process within a country.  
 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
It is evident that the development of financial centres’ is a result of a dynamic competitive process, which is 
expressed through the creation of hierarchical tendencies among the regions and the capital cities in which they are 
located (Poon, 2003). To this extent this paper brings further insights on the role of financial centres on the creation 
of the opposite convergence dynamics that appear to prevail at the national and regional economies in Europe.  In 
particular, we examine the role of financial centres in the creation of this opposite trend from different perspectives. 
Firstly, we analyse the economic converging process of the regions where financial centres are located at the cross-
country level. Secondly, we investigate the converging process among the regions where financial centres are located 
and all the other regions in the same country. From a methodological viewpoint, we extend the club convergence 
model proposed by Chatterji (1992) and Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996) by applying for the first time a local linear 
non-parametric technique (Li and Racine 2004, 2007). 
Our results provide evidence that Frankfurt has consolidated its position among the leading financial centres 
Luxemburg, Paris, Dublin in continental Europe.  This finding is consistent with Poon (2003), who shows the 
increased hierarchical tendencies among financial centres but also fragmentation and differentiation among top tier 
financial centres. Furthermore, we find that the reduction of the gaps of financial centres’ competitiveness sharpens 
the inequalities between the regions where these financial centres are located and the other regions within the same 
country. This result is consistent with ‘non-neutrality’ view of Klagge and Martin (2005, p.387), based on which the 
relationship between finance and the real economy is non-neutral. This means that the spatial structure of the 
financial system can lead to a geographical bias for resource and investment allocation. In return, the regions and 
cities where financial are located absorb investments and skilled labour from the other regions. Thus they grow in a 
disanalogous mode from the other regions within the same country. As a result, this can initiate a diverging process 
between the leading regions/ cities in which the financial centres are located and the rest of the country’s 
regions/cities.  
We also find that the drivers of financial centres’ competitiveness such as market efficiency, market size, 
education and innovation can reduce the existing economic gaps between the regions where financial centres are 
located. The same factors appear to enlarge the existing economic gaps between the regions of financial centres and 
the other regions within the same country.  Conversely, we find that the efficiency of institutions, business 
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sophistication, and infrastructure can speed up the convergence process between the regions where financial centres 
are located and the other regions within the same country. Particularly, the importance of institutions and 
infrastructure on minimizing regional divergence is also highlighted by Petrakos et al. (2005) and Tselios et al. 
(2012), suggesting that institutional arrangements alongside with an efficient allocation of infrastructural 
investments can enhance the convergence process among  regions. Finally, our findings remain the same also when 
we control for potential endogeneity problems between the competitiveness of financial centres and the regional 
economic convergence/divergence.  
Some key limitations should be considered when interpreting these results. The adopted convergence model 
does not clearly allow us to identify whether the gap is driven by leading or lagging regions. We are also aware of 
the fact that there are other characteristics of  leading and lagging regions alongside specific growth mechanisms 
that could affect the converging/diverging patterns between regions. These factors are not incorporated in to our 
analysis and can include factors such as R&D expenditure, patent intensity, productivity growth, spillover effects, 
and European Funds (Crescenzi, 2005; Crescenzi and Giua, 2016; Le Gallo and Dall’Erba, 2008; Petrakos et al., 
2005, 2011). Furthermore, national factors can explain the regional within-country convergence/divergence only 
when these factors also reflect those of the regions where financial centres are located. Finally, our analysis solely 
focuses on the period of the GFC. Nevertheless our findings still provide relevant policy considerations We state 
that policy interventions that aim to maximise the sources of competitiveness of the GFCI may penalise the regional 
economic catch-up of less advanced regions. This can occur when resources, e.g., investments and labour, are 
centralized towards more advanced regions in which the financial centres are typically located. Therefore it is crucial 
that interventions for regional development take into account both the international needs and pressures of the 
regions where financial centres are located along with the needs of more peripheral regions. The increase in the 
competitiveness of financial centres might require to counterbalance the aggregation of financial services in a 
specific location with a network of financial institutions and services dedicated to the support and stimulation of the 
local regional demand and economies. In this context, regional development policies can play a pivotal role in 
reducing the divergence phenomenon. As suggested by Klagge and Martin (2005), these policies could focus on the 
decentralization of financial systems with a further enhancement of regional local clusters and local capital markets 
in terms of institutions, networks and agents.  
Furthermore, national-level interventions that improve the quality of infrastructure, the skills and knowledge 
of human resources, market access, efficiency of business environment, and overall competitiveness can also play 
an important role for regional convergence dynamics. These suggestions align with views expressed by Crescenzi 
and Giua (2016). They propose that EU policies that aim at the reduction of the regional inequalities should not only 
take into consideration territorial conditions but also the national socio-economic environment that can contribute 
to the regional economic patterns. 
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The paper can be further extended in several directions. One might focus on possible spill-over effects between 
regions by collecting additional data at the regional level to examine the convergence pattern of EU regions. 
Alternatively, an additional extension of our study might explore the ways through which resources move between 
regions to better understand the factors underlying the regional economic dynamics. This will also provide 
indications for further interventions to alleviate poverty and unemployment levels between regions. Finally, Brexit 
is likely to alter the existent equilibrium and competitiveness of EU financial centres. Therefore it would be of great 
interest to analyse how Brexit could affect the regional economic dynamics in continental Europe. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GRAT 85 60 0 262 
GGDPPC 38090 19277 0 70500 
WGGDPPC 20706 12999 0 61372 
DBACBA 98.874 1.466 93.928 99.992 
DBAGDP 130.748 65.327 1.163 245.128 
PCRDGDP 102.298 66.738 8.883 237.584 
BDGDP 85.954 74.208 1.470 394.598 
INFRA 5.228 0.894 2.770 6.650 
HEALTH 6.186 0.232 5.592 6.758 
EDU 5.129 0.482 4.351 6.094 
MARKEFFG 4.815 0.427 3.884 5.495 
MARKEFFL 4.511 0.504 3.505 5.600 
MARKSIZ 4.722 0.966 2.159 6.016 
INST 4.920 0.814 3.444 6.182 
MACRO 5.026 0.571 3.290 6.083 
TECHREAD 5.068 0.686 3.294 6.288 
BUSSOPH 4.988 0.600 3.792 5.935 
INNOV 4.290 0.779 2.979 5.756 
Note: GRAT: Financial centres’ rating gap; GGDPPC: Economic gap between EU regions where 
financial centres are located; WGGDPPC: Economic gap between the region where a financial centre 
is located and other regions within the same country; DBACBA: Deposit Money Bank Assets/ 
(Deposit Money + Central) Bank Assets; DBAGDP: Deposit Money Bank Assets/GDP; PCRDGDP: 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks/GDP; BDGDP: Bank Deposits/GDP. Appendix B for the 
other abbreviations. 
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Table 2. GFCI and GDP per Capita: average over the period 2008-2012 
Financial Centres GFCI Rating 
GDP per capita 
Euro per 
inhabitant 
Average Growth 2008-2012 
Financial Centres’ Regions 
Other 
Regions 
VIE 581 44840 1.9% 2.9% 
BRU 588 61000 0.3% 2.3% 
PRG 538 30920 0.2% 1.3% 
CPH 588 60140 2.8% 1.1% 
TLL 500 17700 1.1% 3.9% 
HEL 572 46040 0.9% 2.1% 
PAR 633 83220 1.9% 1.3% 
MUC 614 57780 3.4% 3.0% 
FRA 658 79840 -0.1% 3.0% 
ATH 443 25900 -3.0% -5.0% 
BUD 471 21640 -1.3% -1.1% 
DUB 614 55260 -0.5% -2.2% 
MIL 578 46820 3.2% -0.2% 
ROM 551 33860 2.6% -0.2% 
LUX 635 76400 0.0% 0.0% 
MLA 557 15860 4.3% 4.5% 
AMS 607 56920 5.1% 0.3% 
WAW 518 27940 1.2% 1.9% 
LIS 515 26680 -0.6% 0.0% 
EDI 617 46700 1.9% 1.3% 
GLA 593 39660 1.6% 1.3% 
MAD 578 30220 0.0% -1.7% 
STO 601 52660 6.4% 5.5% 
Note: GDP per capita: Gross domestic product (GDP) at NUTS 3 level. Appendix A for financial 
centres’ abbreviations. 
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Table 3. Estimated average of annual transition matrixes for 2008-2012 
 
A. Financial centers’ rating gaps-GRAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  GDP gaps - between regions (GGDPPC)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. GDP gaps - within regions (WGGDPPC)  
Initial year/Final year State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 
State 1 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
State 2 0.0000 0.9583 0.0417 0.0000 
State 3 0.0000 0.0500 0.8500 0.1000 
State 4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0833 0.9167 
 
             Note: State1= Smaller Gap (1st Quartile) to State 4 =Larger gap (4th Quartile); GRAT: Financial centres’ 
rating gaps; GGDPPC: Economic gap between the EU regions where financial centres are located; 
WGGDPPC: Economic gap between the region where a financial centre is located and the other regions in 
the same country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial year/Final year State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 
State 1 0.7708 0.1458 0.0833 0.0000 
State 2 0.2292 0.5000 0.1875 0.0833 
State 3 0.0000 0.4250 0.5500 0.0250 
State 4 0.0000 0.0000 0.1042 0.8958 
Initial year/Final year State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 
State 1 0.7917 0.2083 0.0000 0.0000 
State 2 0.2083 0.7500 0.0417 0.0000 
State 3 0.0000 0.0500 0.9500 0.0000 
State 4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 4: F-statistics and estimated p-values of the nonparametric regressions 
 
  GGDPPC WGGDPPC 
Variables F-Value P-Value F-Value P-Value 
INFRA 10.5050 0.0000*** 12.8080 0.0000*** 
HEALTH 0.0120 0.9123 12.0940 0.0008*** 
EDU 1.6040 0.2084 4.5150 0.0027*** 
MARKEFFG 10.8410 0.0014*** 4.3260 0.0031*** 
MARKEFFL 5.0590 0.0268** 1.3730 0.2542 
MARKSIZ 5.9670 0.0164** 6.9550 0.0001*** 
INST 0.7530 0.4780 11.4710 0.0010*** 
MACRO 2.0140 0.1590 1.6800 0.1821 
TECHREAD 4.7590 0.0262** 2.7950 0.0979* 
BUSSOPH 9.2950 0.0000*** 3.7960 0.0068*** 
INNOV 2.0710 0.1534 12.8090 0.0000*** 
Note: GGDPPC: Economic gap between the EU regions where financial centres 
are located; WGGDPPC: Economic gap between the region where a financial centre 
is located and the other regions in the same country. Appendix B for the other 
abbreviations. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Appendix A: Financial Centres 
ABBREVIATION FINANCIAL CENTRE 
  
AMS Amsterdam 
ATH Athens 
BRU Brussels 
BUD Budapest 
CPH Copenhagen 
DUB Dublin 
EDI Edinburgh 
FRA Frankfurt 
GLA Glasgow 
HEL Helsinki 
LIS Lisbon 
LUX Luxembourg 
MAD Madrid 
MLA Malta 
MIL Milan 
MUC Munich 
PAR Paris 
PRG Prague 
ROM Rome 
STO Stockholm 
TLL Tallinn 
VIE Vienna 
WAW Warsaw 
 
Appendix B: The drivers of financial centres’ competitiveness 
ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION 
  
INFRA Infrastructure 
HEALTH Health and primary education 
EDU Higher education and training 
MARKEFFG Goods market efficiency 
MARKEFFL Labour market efficiency 
MARKSIZ Market size 
INST Institutions 
MACRO Macroeconomic environment 
TECHREAD Technological readiness 
BUSSOPH Business sophistication 
INNOV Innovation 
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Appendix C: Diachronical representation of the different states of the estimated gaps 
Note: State1= Smaller Gap (1st Quartile) to State 4 =Larger gap (4th Quartile); GRAT=Financial center rating gaps, GGDPPC: Economic gap between 
the EU regions where financial centres are located; WGGDPPC: Economic gap between the region where a financial centre is located and the other 
regions in the same country. 
 
 
  
GRA
T 08 
GRA
T 09 
GRA
T 10 
GRA
T 11 
GRA
T 12 
GGDPC 
P08 
GGDPC 
09 
GGDPC 
10 
GGDPC 
11 
GGDPC 
12 
WGGDPP
C 08 
WGGDPP
C 09 
WGGDPP
C 10 
WGGDPP
C 11 
WGGDPP
C 12 
AMS 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 3 4 
ATH 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
BRU 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 
BUD 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
CPH 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 4 4 3 
DUB 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
EDI 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 4 3 3 3 
FRA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
GLA 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
HEL 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
LIS 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
LUX 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MAD 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
MIL 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
MLA 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
MUC 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
PAR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
PRG 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 
ROM 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
STO 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
TLL 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
VIE 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 
WAW 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
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Figure 1: Convergence clubs for financial centres and EU regions where they are located  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a 
 
 
 
 
 
b 
 
Note: GRAT: Financial centres’ rating gap. Rating gaps are in logarithmic form. GGDPPC: Economic gap between EU regions where financial centres 
are located. All variables are in logarithmic form. 
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Figure 2: The impact of financial centres’ rating gap on the economic gaps of European regions 
  
 
a   
b 
 
Note: GRAT: Financial centres’ rating gap; GGDPPC: Economic gap between EU regions where financial centres are located; WGGDPPC: Economic 
gap between the region where a financial centre is located and other regions within the same country. All variables are in logarithmic form. Following 
Racine et al. (2006), we apply a bootstrapped-based consistent test of significance of the explanatory variables in the non-parametric regression. The 
bootstrapped test indicates that the explanatory variables are statistically significant at a p-value <0.01. 
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Figure 3: Non-parametric regressions between GDP gaps and the main drivers of 
financial centres’ competitiveness 
 
Note: The plots have been constructed applying non-parametric additive regressions with tensor 
smoother products (Wood, 2000, 2004, 2006). GGDPPC: Economic gap between the EU 
regions where financial centres are located; WGGDPPC: Economic gap between the region 
where a financial centre is located and the other regions in the same country. Appendix B for 
the other abbreviations. 
 
a.1 
 
b.1
 
a.2 
 
b.2
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Endnotes 
i To our knowledge the only study that examines the tiers of world financial centres in terms of their evolving 
hierarchical tendencies is the one conducted by Poon (2003).   
ii Data on the GFCI Index is retrieved from http://www.zyen.com/research/gfci.html. Access date 20/03/2015. 
iii Data retrieved from http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/downloads/ 
(10/09/2016). The GFCI provides a complete dataset for all the countries where financial centres are located over 
the period of our analysis. All the indexes range from 1 (worst score) to 7 (best score).  
iv In our local linear estimator, we use a second-order Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth (smoothing parameter) 
introduced by Hurvich et al. (1998), which is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). According to Li 
and Racine (2004, 2007) the particular bandwidth chosen is the most suitable since it has extremely good finite 
sample properties and performs better with small samples. 
v A Fredholm equation of the first kind is an integral equation named by the mathematician Erick Ivan Fredholm. 
In order to explain in a general form an ‘ill-posed’ inverse problem let Θ be a nonlinear operator. Then, according 
to the mathematician Hadanard the inverse problem of solving Θ(𝑥) = 𝑚  is ‘well-posed’ if it satisfies the 
following conditions: (a) solution exists for any 𝑚; (b) the solution is unique; and (c) the inverse mapping 𝑚 ↦ 𝑥 
is continuous. If any of these conditions are not met, then the inverse problem is said to be ‘ill-posed’ (Hall and 
Horowitz; 2005). 
vi For the construction of the transition matrixes the integrated ‘R’-‘markovchain’ package has been applied. For 
details please see https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/markovchain/index.html access date 15/03/2017. 
vii Financial centres of State 2 have a 22% probability of converging with the financial centres of State 1, whereas, 
there is an 18% probability to move to a higher state (State 3) and diverge from the rest of the group. In contrast, 
financial centres of State 3 have a 42% probability of moving to State 2 over the examined period, signifying a 
convergence tendency. 
viii We employed a local constant estimator and a cross-validated bandwidth selection using the method described 
by Hurvich et al., (1998). We also used the ‘R’- ‘np’ package (Hayfield and Racine, 2008). 
ix INFR has a reverse effect on WGGDPPC for a very high score (more than 6). After that threshold it appears to 
reduce GGDPPC and instead increase WGGDPPC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
